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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After police raided his home and discovered harvested still-growing marijuana, 
Mark Beavers was charged with trafficking in marijuana and possessing marijuana with 
the intent to deliver it. This was the First Case. While Mr. Beavers was out on bond, 
awaiting trial, in the First Case, he sold additional marijuana to an undercover police 
officer, was arrested, and had his car and his automobile searched. Again, police found 
harvested and still-growing marijuana. This time, he was charged with delivery of 
marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver it, and trafficking in 
marijuana. In separate trials, where Mr. Beavers attempted (largely unsuccessfully) to 
present necessity defenses (on the basis that the marijuana seized in both cases was 
intended for his personal use and was necessary to treat his various medical 
conditions), but was thwarted to varying degrees by the respective district courts, 
Mr. Beavers was found guilty. At a joint sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that 
Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case could be enhanced based on his "prior 
convictions" in the First Case, and it imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve years, 
with three years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Beavers presents three distinct claims of error: (1) the district 
court erred in the First Case by refusing to instruct the jury regarding the common law 
defense of necessity; (2) the district court erred in the Second Case by precluding 
Mr. Beavers from presenting evidence in support of a necessity defense and by refusing 
to instruct the jury regarding that defense; and (3) the district court erred at the joint 
sentencing hearing insofar as it concluded that Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second 
Case could be enhanced by convictions in the First Case, even though no convictions 
1 
had actually been entered in the First Case as of the time that Mr. Beavers allegedly 
committed the offenses at issue in the Second Case. In light of these errors, 
Mr. Beavers respectfully requests new trials in both cases or, in the alternative, a new 
joint sentencing hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
. On August 13, 2006, based on a claim that the odor of marijuana was coming 
from Mark Beavers' property in Coeur D'Alene, police obtained a warrant authorizing a 
search of Mr. Beavers' property and vehicles. 1 (R., pp.32-26.)2 In executing that 
warrant later the same day, officers found a number of marijuana plants growing in 
Mr. Beavers' two greenhouses, a couple additional marijuana plants in Mr. Beavers' 
basement, and, primarily in Mr. Beavers' kitchen, various vessels containing loose 
marijuana. (R., pp.37-38.) Officers also found literature about marijuana, paraphernalia 
for smoking marijuana, and two scales. (R., pp.30, 37-38.) 
Based on the items discovered in his home, Mr. Beavers was arrested at the 
scene (R., p.43) and, on or about August 28, 2006,3 was charged, in Kootenai County 
1 The officer requesting the search warrant presented additional information in support 
of his request, one piece of which was considered by the magistrate who eventually 
authorized the warrant. (See Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.12, L.10 - p.13, L.17.) 
That additional piece of information consisted of the officer's claim that Mr. Beavers' 
power records showed "cycles that are unusual for a normal usage. They start low, 
they continually grow higher until they peak, and then suddenly drops off and that cycle 
starts over. This, through my training and experience, is very indicative of marijuana 
grow power usage." (Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.5, Ls.1-6.) However, the district 
court later concluded that this particular piece of information were "false and reflected a 
reckless disregard for the truth." (R., pp.230-33.) 
2 The district court filings from the two cases consolidated in this appeal have been 
combined by the district court clerk into a single Clerk's Record. 
3 The discrepancy between the arrest date and the date of the filing of the complaint 
appears to stem from the fact that the State dismissed its original case against 
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Case No. CR-06-18813 (hereinafter, First Case), with two counts of trafficking in 
marijuana-one count for possessing more than 25 pounds of marijuana and one count 
for possessing 25 or more marijuana plants-and one count of possession of marijuana 
with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.50-51; see also R., pp.66-67 (October 10, 2006 
Information).) 
On September 26, 2007, well in advance of Mr. Beavers' trial in the First Case, 
he submitted his requested jury instructions. (R., pp.244-50.) They included a request 
for an instruction of the affirmative defense of necessity. (R., pp.247-48.) 
Not long after Mr. Beavers had requested a jury instruction on the necessity 
defense, the State moved in /imine to preclude Mr. Beavers from offering any evidence 
concerning his need to use marijuana for medicinal reasons. (R., pp.258-59.) At a 
hearing of November 8, 2007, the district court heard arguments on that motion. (See 
generally, Tr. Vol. I, p.121, L.2 - p.134, L.23.)4 At that hearing, the parties' counsel 
debated the availability of a necessity defense where the defendant is charged with 
trafficking and possession with intent to deliver, not just simple possession (see Tr. Vol. 
I, p.121, L.22 - p.133, L.5), but the district court ultimately denied the State's motion in 
Mr. Beavers, and immediately re-filed, all in an effort to circumvent Mr. Beavers' right to 
a speedy preliminary hearing. (See R., p.23.) 
4 There is a number of transcripts in the Record on Appeal in this consolidated appeal. 
The longest one, consisting of approximately 20 different court proceedings, including 
the June 16-19, 2008 trial in the First Case, and the January 30, 2009 joint sentencing 
hearing, is referenced herein as "Tr. Vol. I"; the transcript of the proceedings of January 
14, 2008 is referenced as "Tr. Vol. II"; the transcript of the proceedings of March 3, 2008 
is referenced as 'Tr. Vol. Ill"; the transcript of the proceedings of May 12, 2008 is 
referenced as "Tr. Vol. IV"; the transcript of the proceedings of October 28, 2008, the 
first day of the trial in the Second Case, is referenced as 'Tr. Vol. V"; and the transcript 
of the proceedings of October 29-30, 2008, the second and third days of the trial in the 
Second Case, is referenced as "Tr. Vol. VI." 
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limine because, at the very least, Mr. Beavers might be requesting a jury instruction on 
the lesser-included offense of simple possession. (Tr. Vol. I, p.133, L.6 - p.134, L.23.) 
In the midst of Mr. Beavers' June 2008 trial, after the State had rested, the State 
presented a new, but closely related, motion in limine. This time, the Stale requested 
that Mr. Beavers be precfuded from offering any testimony concerning "his medical 
condition and things tied to his medical condition and treating it with marijuana," and, 
further, asking the district court not to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.779, L.8 - p.780, L.22.) Instead of arguing that the necessity defense was 
unavailable to Mr. Beavers as a matter of law based on the nature of the charges, this 
time the State focused on what it perceived to be a lack of evidence to support the 
necessity defense. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.783, Ls.15-25.) The crux of the State's argument 
was that "the burden is going to be on Mr. Beavers to prove a necessity defense, and 
there is no indication from all the discovery in the file and all the discussions with 
counsel that Mr. Beavers is going to be able to meet that threshold requirement to 
submit a necessity instruction to the jury." (Tr. Vol. I, p.780, Ls.7-12.) However, once 
again, the district court denied the State's motion in I/mine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.785, L.9 -
p.787, L.10.) It indicated that it would not limit the defendant's ability to present his 
defense, especially where evidence of Mr. Beaver's medicinal use of marijuana was 
relevant to whether he had the intent to deliver marijuana, as charged in Count Ill of the 
State's Information; instead, it indicated that it would decide, after all the evidence had 
been presented, whether to instruct the jury on the necessity defense. (Tr. Vol. I, p.785, 
L.25-p.787, L.10.) 
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In light of the district court's ruling allowing him to present his defense, he offered 
extensive testimony concerning his health problems and his medicinal use of marijuana. 
Mr. Beavers testified that, approximately twelve years earlier, he began suffering acute 
gastrointestinal distress, "having pain and discomfort in the rectal area" and "passing 
blood and some kind of fluid." (Tr. Vol. I, p.791, L.17 - p.792, L.1.) He further testified 
that this condition worsened to where he became incontinent and had to begin wearing 
a diaper, and that the incontinence grew to become a daily occurrence. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.792, L.2 - p.793, L.4.) Mr. Beavers indicated that, as his gastrointestinal problems 
worsened, he also developed frequent, severe headaches. (Tr. Vol. I, p.792, Ls.4-11.) 
Eventually, Mr. Beavers began suffer fatigue and depression as well. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793, 
Ls.16-20.) Mr. Beavers testified that his cramps, aches, and pains quickly became 
debilitating, such that he was unable to work. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793, L.13 - p.794, L.5.) 
Mr. Beavers testified that, initially, although he feared that he had cancer, he did 
not seek professional medical care for his symptoms because he had no medical 
insurance and could not afford to pay for medical care out of his own pocket. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.794, L.20 - p.795, L.6, p.798, Ls.6-16.) Accordingly, Mr. Beavers took a holistic, 
naturopathic approach to attempting to improve his health. (Tr. Vol. I, p.795, Ls.7-20.) 
He improved his diet by giving up prepared foods in favor of home-cooked meals 
prepared with organic ingredients and containing more fruits and vegetables; he starting 
doing yoga and meditating; and he began exercising regularly. (Tr. Vol. I, p.795, L.21 -
p.796, L.25.) While these measures, undoubtedly helped Mr. Beavers, they did not cure 
him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.797, Ls.1-4.) Thus, after months of research and self-study, he began 
growing marijuana to use as medicine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.797, L.5 - p.799, L.4.) Initially, 
5 
Mr. Beavers smoked the marijuana he grew; however, as his research progressed, he 
came to believe that his health problems could be better managed by also integrating 
marijuana into his diet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.800, Ls.12-19.) He learned that the "bud material 
[from the marijuana plant] is really more appropriately smoked," and that the leaf 
material (the "shake") "has its best medicinal effect when you process it and you put it in 
the food and eat it." (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.5-15.) Furthermore, because the "the effects 
[of these alternative means of ingestion] are very different" (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.14-15), 
and they affected Mr. Beavers' various symptoms in different ways, Mr. Beavers used 
both methods of ingestion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.807, L.19 - p.808, L.4.) Mr. Beavers testified 
that this holistic, naturopathic approach to his medical condition seemed to work, as his 
dietary changes, exercise, and use of marijuana coincided with an improvement in his 
condition. (Tr. Vol. I, p.854, L.16 - p.856, L.7.) 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial in Mr. Beavers' First Case, 
the district court combined Counts I (trafficking by possession of a certain weight of 
marijuana) and II (trafficking by possession of a certain number of marijuana plants), 
such that a single count of trafficking (written in the alternative, whereby the jury could 
find Mr. Beavers guilty of trafficking if it found that he possessed either the requisite 
weight or the requisite number of plants) would go to the jury.5 (R., p.540; see also 
Tr. Vol. I, p.886, L.16 - p.889, L.7 (State's objection to the district court's combination of 
the two counts, and district court's explanation of its reasoning for doing so).) 
5 The district court's decision to combine Counts I and II into a single count of trafficking 
had no effect on Count Ill (possession with intent to deliver), which also went to the jury 
as originally charged. (See R, pp.547-49.) 
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At this point in the trial, the district court also indicated that it would not be 
instructing the jury on the defense of necessity. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.889, L.23 - p.895, 
L.9.) The district court stated its reasoning as follows: 
[T]he test is an objective standard. In other words, the subjective 
testimony of the defendant would be insufficient to establish the, in and of 
itself, would be insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the 
evidence in the record supported the giving of a [necessity] defense 
[instruction]. I would agree that in State versus Hastings there is nothing 
there to indicate that the medical necessity defense would not be 
[available] ... with regard to a trafficking charge. 
However, in this case the Court is concluding that certainly with 
regard to the trafficking charge there is no-under no objective standard is 
there any evidence here that would indicate that the amounts involved 
were necessary in order to treat the condition. So the Court is pretty 
comfortable with an absolute absence of evidence with regard to that 
element on the trafficking charge. 
With regard to a lesser included of simple possession of 
marijuana, should the jury get to that, the question is a closer one because 
of the State versus Hastings case, but again because of the 
uncontroverted evidence with regard to the amounts here and the lack of 
evidence with regard-other than subjective testimony of the defendant 
himself which of course is certainly pertinent and relevant on a mens rea 
element of why he is possessing the substances, doesn't establish, in the 
Court's view, sufficiency of the evidence to meet the elements of the 
defense, either the specific threat of immediate harm or that the same 
objective could not be accomplished by significantly smaller amounts or, 
for that matter, some other alternative method that is available. 
So the Court's ruling even on the lesser included of the possession 
charge, should the jury get to that, while State versus Hastings certainly 
indicates that the necessity defense is not barred as a matter of law, that 
has not been the ruling by this court. The Court has ruled specifically over 
the state's objection that the necessity defense was available. It is the 
Court's view that the proof in this case is insufficient as a matter of law to 
justify granting-giving the instruction of common law necessity defense, 
even with regard to the lesser of the simple possession of marijuana, and 
certainly it does not apply to the trafficking charge. 
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.893, L.14 - p.895, L.6.) Indeed, the district court ultimately instructed the 
jurors that they could not even consider a necessity defense. It instructed them as 
follows: 
Evidence of medical need has been admitted as it may be relevant 
to contest the issue of intent to deliver, which is an element in the count 
charging Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Deliver, by showing that 
defendant possessed the marijuana only for his own personal use. Do not 
consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for 
which it is admitted. 
(R., p.550; Tr. Vol. I, p.901, Ls.11-18.) Further exacerbating this problem, in her closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that this case "is not about whether 
marijuana is a good way or legitimate way to treat medical issues." (Tr. Vol. I, p.909, 
Ls.1-3.) 
Ultimately, on June 19, 2008, the jury in the First Case found Mr. Beavers guilty 
of trafficking for possessing between five and 25 pounds of marijuana,6 and of 
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.562-63; Tr. Vol. /, p.961, L.2 -
p.963, L.16.) Mr. Beavers would not be sentenced in the First Case until much later. 
* * * * * 
In the meantime, on November 20, 2007, while Mr. Beavers was apparently out 
of jail on bond awaiting his trial in the First Case, the police were able to use a 
confidential informant7 to set up a controlled buy between Mr. Beavers and an 
6 The jury acquitted Mr. Beavers on the greater charge that he had possessed more 
than 25 pounds of marijuana (R.,p.562), and it never reached the question of whether 
Mr. Beavers committed the lesser offense of possessing between 25 and 50 marijuana 
~lants (R., p.563). 
The confidential informant was Catherine Johnson, a woman that Mr. Beavers knew 
from her volunteer work with The Hemp and Cannabis Foundation (hereinafter, THCF), 
a "health and wellness support group for medical marijuana patients" where those 
patients can "exchange medical information" and obtain "safe access, to network with 
each other to help them get their medicine." (Tr. Vol. VI, p.6, L.6 - p.7, L.5.) THCF is 
a 
undercover detective posing as someone with a medical need for marijuana. (See 
R, p.276; Tr. Vol. VI, p.23, L.1 - p.24, L.11.) The controlled marijuana buy occurred the 
following day and, immediately afterward, Mr. Beavers was arrested and his car 
searched. (R., p.276.) In the search of Mr. Beavers' vehicle, police found marijuana in 
a suitcase in his trunk. (R., p.276.) Police then obtained a new search warrant for 
Mr. Beavers' home and, in executing that warrant, located additional marijuana plants 
on Mr. Beavers' property. (R., pp.276-77.) 
Based on the events of November 21, 2007, Mr. Beavers was initially charged, in 
Kootenai County Case No. CR-07-27416 (hereinafter, Second Case), with one count of 
delivery of a controlled substance (marijuana) and one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.271-72.) However, it 
was not long before the State filed an amended complaint adding a third count: 
trafficking in marijuana (for possessing more than 25 marijuana plants). (R., pp.299-
300.) 
On December 21, 2007, following a contested preliminary hearing where 
Mr. Beavers was ultimately bound over on all three charged offenses (see R., p.326), 
the State filed its Information. (R., pp.327-29.) Included in that Information were a host 
of alleged sentencing enhancements, particularly described as follows: 
• In Part II, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at I.C. § 37-
2739 (which would allow for sentences up to twice the sentences 
based in Portland, Oregon, but it holds a clinic once per month in Spokane, 
Washington. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.80, Ls.10-25.) Notably, after meeting with Dr. Thomas 
Orville, M.D., a licensed physician, at THCF, Mr. Beavers received authorization to use 
marijuana for medicinal purposes (in the State of Washington). (Tr. Vol. VI, p.79, L.21 -
p.80, L.25; Defendant's Exhibit B.) 
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otherwise authorized on all three counts), alleging that Mr. Beavers "has 
previously committed a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
and/or a violation of an Idaho [drug] statute .... " (R., p.328 (emphasis 
added).) 
• In Part Ill, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at 
J.C.§ 37-2739A (which would call for a mandatory minimum three-year 
fixed consecutive sentence on the delivery charge), alleging that 
Mr. Beavers "has within the last ten (1 O years committed one or more 
felony offenses of dealing, selling, or trafficking in controlled substances .. 
. . " (R., pp.328-29 (emphasis added).) 
• In Part IV, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at 
I.C. § 37-2732(B)(a)(7)8 (which would call for a mandatory minimum 
sentence twice that which was otherwise required on the trafficking 
charge), alleging that Mr. Beavers "has previously committed a trafficking 
offense .... " (R., p.329 (emphasis added).) 
• In Part V, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at 
I.C. § 19-2514 (which would call for minimum sentences of five years, and 
in increase in the maximum punishments to life, for all three counts), 
8 The State's original Information, as well as the subsequent Amended Information, 
cited LC. § 37-2739B(a)(7) for the sentence enhancement alleged in Part IV. ( See 
R., pp.329 (original Information), 588 (Amended Information).) However, there is no 
section 37-2739B(a)(7) in the Idaho Code. Apparently this was a typographical error on 
the State's part. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.213, L.5 - p.214, L.4.) Accordingly, near the end of 
Mr. Beavers' trial in the Second Case, the district court granted the State leave to 
amend the information to state the correct code section: LC. § 37-2732B(a)(7). (Tr. Vol. 
VI, p.218, Ls.1-4, 19-24.) 
10 
alleging that has "been previously charged with at least two (2) separate 
felony offenses" and, thus, is a "persistent violator" under Idaho law. 
(R., p.329 (emphasis added).) 
Notably, all four of the enhancements charged in the State's December 21, 2007 
Information in the Second Case were based on the offenses alleged in the First Case, 
which the State acknowledged was "still pending," and for which Mr. Beavers' trial was 
still nearly six months away. (R., pp.328-29.) 
On October 28, 2008, the first day of trial, the State filed an Amended 
lnformation.9 (R., pp.586-89.) It appears that the only change made was that, with 
regard to each of the four sentencing enhancements pied, the State removed the words 
"still pending" from the references to alleged prior offenses (because, of course, by this 
time, the trial had finally occurred in the First Case, even if Mr. Beavers had not yet 
been sentenced and no formal judgment of conviction had been entered). (Compare 
R., pp.327-29 (original Information) with R., pp.586-89 (Amended Information).) 
In the meantime, on October 27, 2008, the day before Mr. Beavers' trial was set 
to begin, the State had filed a motion in limine, identical that which it had filed in the 
First Case, asking the district court to preclude Mr. Beavers from offering any evidence 
concerning his need to use marijuana for medicinal reasons. (R., pp.576-77; see also 
R., pp.580-83 (supporting memorandum).) The State's motion was based upon Idaho 
Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. (R., p.577.) Particularly, the State argued that 
the evidence in question was not relevant because "medical necessity/authorization is 
not a defense to the charged offenses" of delivery, possession with intent to deliver, and 
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trafficking (R., pp.581-82), and that it was unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading 
"because such evidence would give a jury the impression that it could somehow 
consider such evidence in reaching a determination on Defendant's guilt, when a jury 
clearly can not .... " (R., p.582.) Alternatively, the State argued, even if a necessity 
defense was available to Mr. Beavers, he could not (in the State's view, and in the view 
of the judge who presided over the trial in the First Case) satisfy the elements of the 
defense and, therefore, he should not even be allowed to try in this case. (R., pp.582-
83.) 
On the morning of the first day of trial in the Second Case, the district court10 
discussed the State's motion in limine. (See Tr. Vol. V, p.83, L.13 - p.93, L.12.) It 
indicated that, if the defense could meet its burden of production with regard to the 
necessity defense, it would allow the defense's evidence to be heard by the jury and it 
would instruct the jury on that defense; however, if the defense could not meet its 
burden of production, it would not even allow the defense to present its evidence to the 
jury, as that evidence would be irrelevant and inadmissible at that point. (Tr. Vol. V, 
p.83, L.13 - p.84, L.5, p.85, Ls.13-18.) The district court further indicated that, in order 
to determine whether the defense could meet its burden of production, it would allow the 
defense to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. (Tr. Vol. V, p.84, 
Ls.6-12, p.84, L.19 - 85, L.1.) 
9 It does not appear that the State ever sought, or received, leave of the district court to 
file its Amended Information on October 28, 2008. (See general/y R.) 
10 A different district court judge presided over Mr. Beavers' trial in the Second Case 
than had presided over his trial in the First Case. 
12 
In accordance with the forgoing plan, on the second day of trial, after the State 
had rested its case-in-chief, the district court took up the matter of whether Mr. Beavers 
would be allowed to present a defense. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.65, L.16 - p.132, L.21.) At 
the outset, the district court again explained that, unless the defense would be entitled 
to a necessity instruction, it would not be allowed to present any evidence as to 
Mr. Beavers' medicinal use of marijuana because that evidence would be "irrelevant 
and unfairly prejudicial, it would lead to the confusion of issues, it would mislead the 
jury, [and] be a waste of the jury's time." (Tr. Vol. VI, p.65, L.20 - p.66, L.8.) 
Thereafter, the district court heard the defense's offer of proof (in the form of sworn 
testimony from Mr. Beavers). (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.67, L.1 - p.120, L.5.) Mr. Beavers' 
testimony was very consistent with his testimony in the First Case. He testified about 
his various medical conditions (irritable bowel syndrome, internal hemorrhoids, Hepatitis 
B and C, hypertension, anxiety, depression, and angina attacks) and the symptoms 
associated with some of those conditions (anal bleeding and discharge, bowel 
discomfort, constipation, and severe headaches) (Tr. Vol. VI, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.1, 
p.73, Ls.10-17, p.84, L.24 - p.85, L.7); he testified that his medical problems had had a 
tremendous impact on his life (Tr. Vol. VI, p.84, Ls.1-12); he testified that he was 
eventually granted authorization by the State of Washington to use marijuana for 
medicinal purposes (Tr. Vol. VI, p.79, L.4 - p.80, L.20); and he testified that the use of 
marijuana, especially combined with an improved diet and a regimen of exercise, yoga, 
and meditation, alleviates his symptoms and allows him to function again. (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.83, Ls.16-25, p.85, L.21 - p.86, L.16, p.93, Ls.2-25, p.95, Ls.14-20, p.97, Ls.18-19, 
p.98, Ls.8-15). Mr. Beavers further testified that he had no health insurance (Tr. Vol. VI, 
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p.81, Ls.7-8), generally could not afford to see specialists or pay for emergency room 
visits (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, L.9 - p.82, L.23), and, when he did eventually seek 
traditional medical care for his condition, he received a medication that helped, but 
brought on a significant side effect (angina) that caused him to have to stop taking that 
medication. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.75, L.24 - p.79, L.5.) 
Following the defense's offer of proof, the district court heard arguments as to 
whether Mr. Beavers' testimony would warrant a jury instruction on the defense of 
necessity and, if not, whether Mr. Beavers would be allowed to testify at all regarding 
his medical need for marijuana. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.120, L.14 - p.132, L.21.) Ultimately, 
the district court decided that it would not be instructing the jury on the defense of 
necessity and, thus, Mr. Beavers could not even present to the jury his testimony 
concerning his medical need for marijuana. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.7 - p.132, L.21.) It 
reasoned as follows: 
[l]t's my opinion that ... there's an absence of evidence that the 
defendant lacked adequate legal medical alternatives to the use of 
marijuana, that there's no reasonable evidence of any specific threat of 
any immediate harm to the defendant, that there's no reasonable evidence 
that the defendant could have prevented the threatened harm by any less 
offensive alternative such as the reasonable pursuit of medical attention, 
which I don't find he engaged in. 
. . . . [l]n my opinion, any-I don't believe he reasonably pursued 
medical attention for the complaints he has. Certainly had he done so, he 
very well may have been able to receive legally prescribed medication for 
any psychological problem such as depression or anxiety or any medical 
condition that he complained of such as high blood pressure. 
There was no reasonable evidence submitted by the defense that, 
based upon the amount seized from the defendant an the number of 
plants involved and the fact that he was actually selling marijuana, that the 
harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm. 
Certainly it's difficult to belief [sic] that he was simply growing for his own 
use when, at the same-if, at the same time as the evidence clearly 
shows, he was selling marijuana. 
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So after having considered all the evidence submitted by the State 
during the trial as well as the evidence submitted by the defendant outside 
the presence of the jury, its my determination that there's no-that, in fact, 
no reasonable view of the evidence would support the giving of the 
instruction on [the] common law defense of necessity. 
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.8- p.132, L.21.) 
In light of the district court's ruling, Mr. Beavers had virtually nothing to present in 
his own defense (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.134, L.1 - p.138, L.6 (Mr. Beavers' exceptionally 
brief direct testimony)), and the defense quickly rested. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.147, Ls.22-
23.) 
At the final jury instruction conference, defense counsel lodged one final 
objection to the district court's refusal to allow Mr. Beavers to present his defense or 
have the jury instructed on the defense of necessity: 'The necessity instruction. We 
have asked the Court to give that instruction. We object on the grounds of the 
deprivation of my client for a full and fair trial to present a full and vigorous defense on 
his behalf, and we would ask the Court to give the necessity instruction." (Tr. Vol. VI, 
p.155, Ls.5-10.) However, the district court was still not swayed, as it its final 
instructions to the jury contained no mention of the defense of necessity. (See 
R., pp.628-53.) 
In light of all of this, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three alleged offenses. 
(R., pp.655-56; Tr. Vol. VI, p.220, L.24 - p.221, L.23.) Thereafter, Mr. Beavers waived 
his right to a jury trial as to Parts II, Ill, and IV of the Amended lnformation, 11 and 
conditionally admitted the fact underlying the sentencing enhancements pied in those 
three parts of the Information, i.e., the fact that he had been found guilty of both 
11 The State dismissed the "persistent violator" enhancement pied in Part V of the 
Information. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.228, Ls.23-24, p.232, Ls.15-19.) 
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trafficking in marijuana, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, in the 
First Case. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.223, L.17 - p.233, L.17.) Although he admitted that fact 
that he had been found guilty in the First Case, Mr. Beavers specifically preserved his 
right to argue, as a legal matter, that the verdicts in the First Case could not be used to 
enhance his sentences in the Second Case. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.224, L.24 - p.225, L.6.) 
* * * * * 
The First Case and the Second Case were consolidated for purposes of 
sentencing. January 21, 2009 was the original setting for that sentencing hearing; 
however the State requested a continuance so as to have time to submit a sentencing 
memorandum setting forth its arguments concerning how the charged enhancements 
ought to apply. (Tr. Vol. I, p.984, Ls.1 - p.985, L.12) Ultimately, the district court 
granted the State's request, observing that it could use some input from the parties in 
light of the fact that "the sentencing issues, as far as I can see on this case, it would 
maybe understate the situation to say it is complex." (Tr. Vol. I, p.987, Ls.1-12, p.987, 
L.25 - p.988, L.5.) 
Two days later, on January 23, 2009, the State filed its sentencing memorandum. 
(R., pp.661-66.) In that memorandum, the State argued that Mr. Beavers' sentences in 
the Second Case were properly enhanced based on the jury's verdicts in the First Case 
because those verdicts constituted a prior "conviction." (R., pp.664-65.) In addition, the 
State presented arguments as to how it believed the various enhancements should 
apply. (R., pp.662-65.) 
On January 29, 2009, Mr. Beavers filed his responsive sentencing memorandum. 
(R., pp.667-70.) In that memorandum, Mr. Beavers argued primarily that the guilty 
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verdicts in the First Case could not be used to enhance the sentences in the Second 
Case. (R., pp.667-70.) Mr. Beavers explained that, at the relevant time-the time when 
he allegedly committed the offenses charged in the Second Case-he had not 
previously been convicted of the drug crimes in question because he had not yet been 
sentenced for, or even found guilty of, those offenses. (R., pp.668-70.) 
The next day, the district court held a lengthy sentencing hearing. ( See generally 
Tr. Vol. I, p.997, L.1 - p.1076, L.7.) During the first phase of that hearing, the district 
court discussed, and heard arguments on, the law with regard to: the base sentences 
for the charged offenses; the question of whether those sentences could (or must) be 
enhanced under the facts of these cases; and, assuming the enhancements apply, how 
those enhancements would affect the base sentences. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.997, L.1 -
p.1025, L.10.) With regard to the question of whether the jury's verdicts in the First 
Case could (or must) be used to enhance the sentences imposed in the Second Case, 
the district court ultimately ruled that the enhancements apply. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1024, L.3 -
p.1025, L.10.) 
During the second phase of the January 20, 2009 sentencing hearing, the district 
court went over corrections to the PSI, listened to Mr. Beavers' allocution, took 
arguments from the parties' counsel, and, ultimately, imposed the following sentences: 
• Trafficking by possessing between 5 and 25 pounds of marijuana (in the 
First Case): six years, with three years fixed; 
• Possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver (in the First Case): five 
years, with one year fixed, concurrent; 
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• Delivery of marijuana (in the Second Case): Five years, with two years 
fixed, concurrent; 
• Possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver (in the Second Case): 
Five years, with two years fixed, concurrent; and 
• Trafficking by possessing up to 25 marijuana plants (in the Second Case): 
Twelve years, with two years fixed, concurrent. 
(R., pp.681-82; Tr. Vol. I, p.1072, L.2 - p .1073, L.4.) Thus, Mr. Beavers' aggregate 
sentence is twelve years, with three years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1068, Ls.7-10, p.1072, 
Ls.3-5.) 
On February 4, 2009, the district court entered a judgment of conviction bearing 
the case numbers of both the First Case and the Second Case. (R., pp.680-83.) Just 
over a week later, on February 13, 2009, Mr. Beavers timely filed notices of appeal in 
both cases.12 (R., pp.689-91 (Notice of Appeal in Second Case); Notice of Appeal, 
Kootenai County No. CR-06-18813 (Feb. 13, 2009) (Notice of Appeal in First Case). 13) 
On appeal, Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the First Case by failing 
12 On March 6, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order consolidating the 
appeals of the First Case and the Second Case. 
1 Undersigned counsel is currently in possession of an un-file-stamped copy of the 
Notice of Appeal in the First Case and, based on the district court's Register of Actions 
from the First Case, believes that a copy of that document was, in fact, filed with the 
district court on February 13, 2009. Undersigned counsel has been attempting to obtain 
a filed-stamped copy of said Notice or Appeal (which could then be attached to a motion 
to augment the Record on Appeal) from the district court but, as of the filing of this 
Appellant's Brief, has not yet received it. When a file-stamped copy of the Notice of 
Appeal is provided to undersigned counsel, Mr. Beavers will file a motion to augment 
the Record on Appeal with that document attached. If, however, the district court is 
unable, or unwilling, to provide the requested Notice of Appeal within a reasonable time, 
Mr. Beavers will file a motion to augment the Record on Appeal without the document 
attached, and will ask the Supreme Court to order the district court to provide that 
document. 
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to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity; it erred in the Second Case 
by refusing to allow Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered 
necessity defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense; and it erred at 
the joint sentencing hearing by enhancing Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case 
based on its finding that he had been previously convicted of certain drug offenses in 
the First Case. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' First Case by refusing to instruct the jury 
on the affirmative defense of necessity? 
2. Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' Second Case by refusing to allow 
Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered necessity defense, 
and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense? 
3. Did the district court err at Mr. Beaver's joint sentencing hearing by enhancing 
Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case based on its finding that he had 




In Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On 
The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in denying his request that the 
jury in the First Case be instructed that, even if it found that Mr. Beavers possessed 
marijuana, it could find him not guilty on the basis of the common law defense of 
necessity based on the fact that his use of marijuana was necessary lo treat his medical 
condition. He asserts that he met his burden of production as lo the four elements of 
the defense by offering evidence that: (1) he faced a specific threat of immediate harm, 
i.e., a debilitating gastrointestinal condition; (2) his gastrointestinal condition was not a 
product of his own doing; (3) he could not have obtained relief from his gastrointestinal 
condition by means other than the use of marijuana; and (4) the harm caused by using 
marijuana, if any, was not disproportionate to the suffering avoided. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
In State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the common law defense of necessity is available to defendants 
claiming that they possessed and ingested marijuana for medicinal purposes. Id. at 
854-55, 801 P.2d at 563-64. In Hastings, the Court outlined the four elements of the 
necessity defense: 
1. A specific threat of immediate harm; 
2. The circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not have 
been brought about by the defendant; 
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3. The same objective could not have been accomplished by a less 
offensive alternative available to the actor; 
4. The harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. 
Id. at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. 
As with any defense in Idaho, the defendant asserting a necessity defense bears 
"[t]he burden of production, i.e., [the burden] of raising a prima facie defense .... " 
State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66 & n.2, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 & n.2 (Ct. App. 2000). 
In other words, the defendant bears the burden of producing such evidence that "a 
reasonable view of the record support[s] the elements of his affirmative defense[] .... " 
Id. at 656-665-66, 8 P.3d at 660-61. The defendant, however, does not bear the burden 
of persuasion; once he has satisfied his burden of production, it is incumbent upon the 
State to disprove (under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard) his defense.14 See 
I.C.J. I. 1512 (pattern jury instruction for the necessity defense, providing that "[t]he state 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act because of 
necessity"); cf State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816, 817 & n.1, 673 P.2d 416,417 & n.1 
(1983) (calling a jury instruction a correct statement of the law of entrapment where it 
indicated that it was the State's burden to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
defendant's claim of entrapment). 
14 The burden of proof applicable to defenses in criminal cases is discussed in detail in 
the commentary provided with I.C.J.I. 1500. In that commentary, the Committee looks 
back more than 100 years, tracing the development of the law with respect to 
"affirmative" defenses, and opines that the mere fact that defenses in Idaho have 
traditionally been called "affirmative" defenses, "the general rule in Idaho is that the 
defendant in a criminal case has the burden of producing evidence regarding any 
defense, but he does not have the burden of persuasion. Once the defense is properly 
raised, the state must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt." I.C.J.I. 1500 cmt. 
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With regard to the question of when the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction 
on his proffered necessity defense, it is well-settled that the applicable standard is 
couched in terms that are substantially the same as those used to describe his burden 
of production: "[a] defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have a legal theory of 
defense submitted to the jury through an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the 
evidence that would support the theory." State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413,414, 34 P.3d 
1096, 1097 (Ct. App. 2001); accord State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878-79, 920 P.2d 
391, 395-96 (1996). Thus, it is clear that the defendant seeking to place a necessity 
defense before the jury must present a prima facie case of necessity, i.e., he must 
present sufficient facts such that there is a "reasonable view" of the evidence to support 
the elements of the defense; however, the defendant has no obligation to overcome the 
State's evidence. 
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has said that "[t]he question of whether there 
is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports an instruction to the jury on the 
defense of necessity is [a] matter of discretion for the district court," Howley, 128 Idaho 
at 878, 920 P.2d at 395, this discretionary standard, and its attendant "abuse of 
discretion" standard on review, see id. at 879, 920 P.2d at 396, appears to be a 
misnomer. The question of whether a party has presented a prima facie case is 
typically judged under an objective standard and, thus, is typically considered to be a 
question of law, subject to de nova review. See, e.g., State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 
461, 988 P.2d 685, 687 (1999) (holding that the denial of a motion for acquittal is 
reviewed de nova); Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 650-51, 448 P.2d 653, 656-57 
(1968) (holding that a motion for dismissal under I.R.C.P. 41(6), which implicates the 
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question of whether the plaintiff met his burden of presenting a prima facie case, 
presents a question of law). Thus, it would seem that the Court of Appeals was correct 
when it held that "[w]hether proffered evidence is sufficient to make a prima facie 
showing of an affirmative [necessity] defense is a question of law which we freely 
review." State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 321, 882 P.2d 974, 976 (Ct. App. 1994). 
This makes sense, of course, because the question of whether a jury was properly 
instructed on the law is generally considered a legal question, subject to de nova review 
on appeal. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 461, 988 P .2d at 687 ("The question of whether the 
jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review.") Accordingly, the language of Howley notwithstanding, Mr. Beavers' claim that 
the district court erred in denying his requested necessity defense instruction should be 
reviewed de nova by this Court. 
C. Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Should Have 
Instructed The Jury On The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity 
Taking an objectively reasonable view of the evidence presented by the defense 
in this case, it is clear that Mr. Beavers satisfied his burden of production as to the four 
elements of the common law defense of necessity. Therefore, it was legal error for the 
district court to have declined to instruct the jury as to the availability and elements of 
that defense. 
1. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate 
Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition 
As noted above, during the trial in the First Case, Mr. Beavers offered extensive 
testimony concerning his health problems. Mr. Beavers testified that, approximately 
twelve years earlier, he began suffering acute gastrointestinal distress, "having pain and 
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discomfort in the rectal area" and "passing blood and some kind of fluid." (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.791, L.17- p.792, L.1.) He further testified that this condition worsened to where he 
became incontinent and had to begin wearing a diaper, and that the incontinence grew 
to become a daily occurrence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.792, L.2 - p.793, L.4.) Mr. Beavers 
indicated that, as his gastrointestinal problems worsened, he also developed frequent, 
severe headaches. (Tr. Vol. I, p.792, Ls.4-11.) Eventually, Mr. Beavers began suffer 
fatigue and depression as well. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793, Ls.16-20.) Mr. Beavers testified that 
his cramps, aches, and pains quickly became debilitating, such that he was unable to 
work. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793, L.13 - p.794, L.5.) 
Surely, abdominal pain, coupled with ongoing rectal bleeding and severe 
headaches, all of which causes the sufferer to be completely incapacitated, is a "threat 
of immediate harm" within the meaning of Hastings. Indeed, the State never questioned 
Mr. Beavers' claim that his gastrointestinal condition constituted a "threat of immediate 
harm" (see R., pp.258-59 (State's motion in limine); Tr. Vol. I, p.124, L.4 - p.126, L.12 
(State's arguments at the hearing on its motion in limine), p.132, L.2 - p.133, L.5 
(same); (Tr. Vol. I, p.779, L.8 - p.780, L.20 (State's argument at trial seeking to 
preclude Mr. Beavers from testifying about his medical condition), p.783, L.15 - p.785, 
L.8 (same)), and the district court impliedly found that Mr. Beavers' gastrointestinal 
condition did constitute a "threat of immediate harm" (see Tr. Vol. I, p.893, L.14 - p.895, 
L.6 (finding that Mr. Beavers was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of 
necessity because he failed to explain how the quantity of marijuana allegedly found 
was necessary to remedy his condition)). 
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2. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About 
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His 
Illegal Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana 
Since the "specific threat of immediate harm" at issue in this case is Mr. Beavers" 
illness. it is obviously not something that he brought about on his own. 
3. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective, i.e., 
A Modest Recovery, Could Not Have Been Accomplished By A Less 
Offensive Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was Actually 
Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him 
For purposes of this case, the most critical element of the necessity defense is 
the requirement that the same objective could not have been accomplished by any less 
offensive alternatives that were actually available. Thus. in the context of this case, the 
operative question becomes whether Mr. Beavers could have satisfactorily treated his 
gastrointestinal condition through conventional medicine. 
Keeping in mind that Mr. Beavers' burden was only to produce evidence on this 
point. not to persuade the finder of fact, he submits that he met his burden by 
presenting prima facie evidence that he had no choice but to use marijuana to treat his 
gastrointestinal condition. As noted, Mr. Beavers testified that he did not seek 
professional medical care for his symptoms because he had no medical insurance and 
could not afford to pay for medical care out of his own pocket. (Tr. Vol. I, p.794, L.20 -
p.795. L.6, p.798, Ls.6-16.) Accordingly, Mr. Beavers was forced to take a holistic, 
naturopathic approach to dealing with his health. (Tr. Vol. I, p.795, Ls.7-20.) He 
improved his diet by giving up prepared foods in favor of home-cooked meals prepared 
with organic ingredients and containing more fruits and vegetables; he started doing 
yoga and meditating; and he began exercising regularly. (Tr. Vol. I. p.795. L.21 - p.796, 
L.25.) While these measures, undoubtedly helped Mr. Beavers, they did not cure him. 
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.797, Ls.1-4.) Thus, after months of research and self-study, he began 
growing marijuana to use as medicine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.797, L.5 - p.799, L.4.) Initially, 
Mr. Beavers smoked the marijuana he grew; however, as his research progressed, he 
came to believe that his health problems could be better managed by also integrating 
marijuana into his diet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.800, Ls.12-19.) He learned that the "bud material 
[from the marijuana plant] is really more appropriately smoked," and that the leaf 
material (the "shake") "has its best medicinal effect when you process it and you put it in 
the food and eat it." (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.5-15.) Furthermore, because the "the effects 
[of these alternative means of ingestion] are very different" (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.14-15), 
and they affected Mr. Beavers' various symptoms in different ways, Mr. Beavers used 
both methods of ingestion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.807, L.19 - p.808, L.4.) Mr. Beavers testified 
that this holistic, naturopathic approach to his medical condition seemed to work, as his 
dietary changes, .exercise, and use of marijuana coincided with an improvement in his 
condition. (Tr. Vol. I, p.854, L.16- p.856, L.7.) 
Although the district court concluded that Mr. Beavers was not entitled to a 
necessity instruction "because of the uncontroverted evidence with regard to the 
amounts" at issue, the district court's focus was misplaced. First, the amounts at issue 
were not "uncontroverted"; in fact, in his own testimony, Mr. Beavers challenged the 
State's claim that he possessed more than 25 pounds of marijuana. (Tr. Vol. I, p.822, 
L.23 - p.823, L.823, L.6, p.841, L.20 - p.842, L.3.) (And, indeed, the jury ultimately 
found that he possessed less than the 25 pounds alleged by the State. (R., pp.562-
63.)) Second, and more importantly, the district court's comments make it clear that it 
was improperly weighing Mr. Beavers' testimony against the State's evidence and 
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concluding that Mr. Beavers' story simply was not credible. In essence then, the district 
court's ruling was based on its erroneously placing the burden of persuasion on 
Mr. Beavers. Had the district court applied the correct standard-the production of 
evidence standard-it would have had to have concluded that Mr. Beavers' presented 
prima facie evidence that he could not have treated his illness without marijuana, and it 
would have been up to the jury to decide whether that evidence was credible. 
4. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The 
Harm Caused, i.e .• Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was 
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided. i.e .. Mr. Beavers· Continued 
Suffering And Incapacitation 
Although the State can undoubtedly argue some sort of theoretical "societal 
harm" argument to try to justify the criminalization of the growing, possession, and use 
of marijuana, the fact is that, in this case, there is simply no evidence of anyone having 
actually been harmed by Mr. Beavers' medicinal use of marijuana. Moreover, given the 
harm avoided-Mr. Beavers' continued suffering and incapacitation-it simply cannot 
be said that the societal harm (assuming there is some) is disproportionate to the 
suffering that Mr. Beavers avoided. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Mr. Beavers' Second Case By Refusing To Allow 
Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence In Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense, And 
By Refusing To Instruct The Jury On That Defense 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the Second Case by denying 
him the opportunity to present evidence concerning his health conditions and his 
medical need for marijuana, and in declining to instruct the jury that, even if it found that 
28 
Mr. Beavers possessed marijuana, it could nevertheless find him not guilty of trafficking 
based on the common law defense of necessity because his use of marijuana was 
necessary to treat his medical condition. He asserts that he met his burden of 
production as to the four elements of the defense by offering evidence that: (1) he 
faced a specific threat of immediate harm, i.e., debilitating illness; (2) his medical 
condition was not a product of his own doing; (3) he could not have obtained relief from 
his medical condition by means other than the use of marijuana; and (4) the harm 
caused by using marijuana, if any, was not disproportionate to the suffering avoided. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
As discussed in Part 1.8, above, the common law defense of necessity is 
available to defendants claiming that they possessed and ingested marijuana for 
medicinal purposes, Hastings, 118 Idaho at 854-55, 801 P.2d at 563-64; however, the 
defendant bears the burden of production, such that he is not entitled to a jury 
instruction on his proffered necessity defense unless he has presented prima facie 
evidence of necessity, see Howley, 128 Idaho at 878-79, 920 P.2d at 395-96. 
Just as was done by the district court in Mr. Beavers' Second Case, some of the 
Idaho decisions addressing defendants' requests for jury instructions on the necessity 
defense have blended the jury instruction issue with the question of whether the 
defendant can even present his necessity defense. See, e.g., Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 
920 P.2d 391; State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 882 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1994). The 
theory behind this approach, it would seem, is that, if the defendant cannot produce 
sufficient evidence of his necessity theory to warrant a jury instruction, any evidence on 
that topic would be irrelevant. Chisholm, 126 Idaho at 322-23, 882 P.2d at 977-78. 
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Moreover. this blended approach makes a certain amount of sense given that both 
questions (whether evidence concerning the defense can be presented and whether the 
jury can be instructed) seem to call for the same inquiry: whether the defendant has 
presented prima facie evidence as to the four elements of the necessity defense. See 
Tadlock. 136 Idaho at 414. 34 P.3d at 1097; Howley, 128 Idaho at 878-79, 920 P.2d at 
395-96. Chisholm. 126 Idaho at 322-23. 882 P.2d at 977-78. 
As with the more narrow question of whether the defendant has presented prima 
facie evidence entitling him to a jury instruction on the necessity defense. the blended 
question of whether he is entitled to present that defense and receive a jury instruction 
on that defense. involves a question of law which Mr. Beavers submits is subject to de 
nova review. See Part I.B. supra (arguing that the question of whether a party has 
presented a prima facie case is typically judged under an objective standard and, thus, 
is typically considered to be a question of law, subject to de novo review); see also 
State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,228, 178 P.3d 28. 31 (2008) ("The question of whether 
evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to admit relevant evidence 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). 
C. Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers· Second Case. The District Court Should Have 
Allowed Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence Relating To The Affirmative Defense 
Of Necessity, And It Should Have Instructed The Jury About That Defense 
Taking an objectively reasonable view of the evidence presented by the defense 
in the Second Case. it is clear that Mr. Beavers satisfied his burden of production as to 
the four elements of the common law defense of necessity. Therefore. it was legal error 
for the district court to have precluded him from testifying as to his medical need for 
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marijuana, and to have declined to instruct the jury as to the availability and elements of 
the necessity defense. 
1. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate 
Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition 
As he had while testifying in front of the jury in the First Case, during his offer of 
proof in the Second Case Mr. Beavers testified about his various medical conditions 
(irritable bowel syndrome, internal hemorrhoids, Hepatitis B and C, hypertension, 
anxiety, depression, and angina attacks) and the symptoms associated with some of 
those conditions (anal bleeding and discharge, bowel discomfort, constipation, and 
severe headaches). (Tr. Vol. VI, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.1, p.73, Ls.10-17, p.84, L.24 -
p.85, L.7 .) Furthermore, Mr. Beavers testified that his medical problems had had a 
tremendously negative impact on his life. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.84, Ls.1-12.) 
Surely Mr. Beavers' illnesses and their attendant symptoms, all of which had a 
profound impact on his life, constitute a "threat of immediate harm" within the meaning 
of Hastings. Indeed, the district court impliedly found that Mr. Beavers' health 
conditions did constitute a "threat of immediate harm" (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.8 -
p.132, L.21) (concluding that Mr. Beavers would not be allowed to present his defense, 
and was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of necessity, because he failed to 
establish that he went to reasonable lengths to pursue medical attention before turning 
to marijuana and because, based on the State's evidence, the district court simply did 
not believe that Mr. Beavers was growing marijuana solely to remedy his own health 
problems)). 
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2. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About 
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His 
Illegal Act, i.e .. His Possession And Use Of Marijuana 
Just as with the First Case, since the "specific threat of immediate harm" at issue 
in the Second Case was Mr. Beavers' illness, it was obviously not something that he 
brought about on his own. 
3. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective. i.e., 
A Modest Recovery, Could Not Have Been Accomplished By A Less 
Offensive Alternative. e.g.. Traditional Medicine, That Was Actually 
Available, i.e .. Affordable. To Him 
As with the First Case, the most critical element of the necessity defense with 
regard to the Second Case is the requirement that the same objective could not have 
been accomplished by any less offensive alternatives that were actually available to 
Mr. Beavers. Thus, the operative question becomes whether Mr. Beavers could have 
satisfactorily treated his gastrointestinal condition through conventional medicine. 
Keeping in mind that Mr. Beavers' burden was only to produce evidence on this 
point, not to persuade the finder of fact, he submits that he met his burden by 
presenting prima facie evidence that he had no choice but to use marijuana to treat his 
gastrointestinal condition. As noted, in his offer of proof, Mr. Beavers testified that he 
had no health insurance (Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, Ls.7-8), he generally could not afford to see 
specialists or pay for emergency room visits (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, L.9 - p.82, L.23), 
and, when he did eventually seek traditional medical care for his condition, he received 
a medication that helped, but brought on a significant side effect (angina) that caused 
him to have to stop taking that medication. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.75, L.24 - p.79, L.5.) He 
further testified that he was eventually granted authorization by the State of Washington 
to use marijuana for medicinal purposes (Tr. Vol. VI, p.79, L.4 - p.80, L.20), and that the 
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use of marijuana, especially when combined with an improved diet and a regimen of 
exercise, yoga, and meditation, alleviated his symptoms and allowed him to function 
again (Tr. Vol. VI, p.83, Ls.16-25, p.85, L.21 - p.86, L.16, p.93, Ls.2-25, p.95, Ls.14-20, 
p.97, Ls.18-19, p.98, Ls.8-15). 
The district court concluded that Mr. Beavers would not be allowed to testify 
about his illnesses and his medical need for marijuana, and that he was not entitled to a 
jury instruction on the defense of necessity, because he failed to establish that he went 
to reasonable lengths to pursue medical attention before turning to marijuana and 
because, based on the State's evidence, the district court simply did not believe that 
Mr. Beavers was growing marijuana solely to remedy his own health problems. (Tr. Vol. 
VI, p.131, L.8 - p.132, L.21.) This ruling, however, was incorrect. First, as noted 
above, Mr. Beavers testified that he could not afford to go to the doctor initially and, 
when he did eventually go, the conventional remedy provided was no remedy at all 
because it came with significant side effects. This was sufficient to satisfy Mr. Beavers' 
burden of production, even if it did not persuade the district court. 
Second, insofar as the district court simply did not believe Mr. Beavers' 
testimony, as noted above in Part I.C.3, this type of weighing of the evidence is 
inconsistent the applicable legal standard, whereby only the burden of production, not 
the burden of persuasion, was on Mr. Beavers. Moreover, a district court simply cannot 
weigh the perceived strength of the State's evidence in determining whether the 
defendant ought to be allowed to present evidence in his defense. Holmes v. South 
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 (2006). 
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Had the district court applied the correct standard-the production of evidence 
standard-it would have had to have concluded that Mr. Beavers' presented prima facie 
evidence that he could not have treated his illness without marijuana, and it would have 
been up to the jury to decide whether that evidence was credible. 
4. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The 
Harm Caused, i.e., Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was 
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e., Mr. Beavers' Continued 
Suffering And Incapacitation 
Again, although the State can come up with a theoretical "societal harm" 
argument to try to justify the criminalization of the growing, possession, and use of 
marijuana, the fact is that, in this case, there is simply no evidence of anyone having 
actually been harmed by Mr. Beavers' medicinal use of marijuana. Moreover, given the 
harm avoided-Mr. Beavers' continued suffering and incapacitation-it cannot be said 
that the societal harm (assuming there is some) is disproportionate to the suffering that 
Mr. Beavers avoided. 
The district court weighed the State's evidence heavily in finding that the harm 
caused was disproportionate to the harm avoided: 
There was no reasonable evidence submitted by the defense that, 
based upon the amount seized from the defendant and the number of 
plants involved and the fact that he was actually selling marijuana, that the 
harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm. 
Certainly it's difficult to belief [sic] that he was simply growing for his own 
use when, at the same-if, at the same time as the evidence clearly 
shows, he was selling marijuana. 
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.132, Ls.6-14.) However, as noted, the standard for determining whether 
Mr. Beavers had a right to present his necessity defense and was entitled to a jury 
instruction on the common law defense of necessity, did not call for the district court to 
weigh the evidence and base its decision on whether it thought Mr. Beavers was guilty. 
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See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 329-31. The correct standard was simply determining whether 
Mr. Beavers presented prima facie evidence. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66 & 
n.2, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 & n.2 (Ct. App. 2000). Clearly, he did. 
111. 
The District Court Erred At Mr. Beaver's Joint Sentencing Hearing By Enhancing 
Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Based On Its Finding That He Had Been 
Previously Convicted Of Certain Drug Offenses In The First Case 
A. Introduction 
In the Second Case, the State pied four sentencing enhancements based on the 
allegation that Mr. Beavers had previously "committed" the drug crimes charged in the 
First Case. (R., pp.327-29 (original Information) (emphasis added), pp.596-89 
(Amended Information) (emphasis added).) At the time that the original Information was 
filed, of course, the State could only allege that Mr. Beavers had "committed" the 
previous drug crimes because, at that point, Mr. Beavers had not actually been 
"convicted" of those crimes. (Compare R., pp.327-29 (December 21, 2007 Information 
in the Second case) with R., pp.562-64 (June 19, 2008 verdict in the First Case).) 
The State ultimately proceeded with three of the four enhancements originally 
pied: 
• I.C. § 37-2739, which would allow for sentences up to twice the sentences 
otherwise authorized on all three counts in the Second Case. 
Section 37-2739 applies to· "[a]ny person convicted of or subsequent 
offense," and it specifically states that, "(f]or purposes of this section, an 
offense is a second subsequent offense, if, prior to his conviction of the 
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offense, the offender has at any time been convicted" of a drug offense. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
• I.C. § 37-2739A, which would call for a mandatory minimum three-year 
fixed consecutive sentence on the delivery charge. Section 37-2739A 
applies to anyone "who has previously been convicted within the last ten 
(10) years" of any "dealing, selling, or trafficking" offense. This 
enhancement does not contain any kind of definition of what constitutes a 
previous conviction. See id. (emphasis added). 
• I.C. § 37-2732(B)(a)(7), which would call for a mandatory minimum 
sentence twice that which was otherwise required on the trafficking 
charge. Section 37-2732(B)(a)(7) applies to any "second conviction for 
any trafficking offense .... " Id. (emphasis added). 
(See Tr. Vol. VI, p.222, L.10 - p.229, L.2.) Eventually, the district court ruled that all 
three of those enhancements could be applied in the Second Case because, by then, 
Mr. Beavers had been found guilty, i.e., "convicted," in the First Case. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.1024, L.3 - p.1025, L.8.) Apparently, the district court took the approach that the 
foregoing enhancements apply so long as the "conviction," i.e., guilty verdict, for the first 
offense(s) came about prior to the sentencing hearing for the second offense(s), without 
regard as to whether the "conviction" for the first offense predated the commission of 
the second offense. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1024, L.3- p.1025, L.8.) 
Mr. Beavers submits that the district court's ruling was in error and that, in fact, 
the enhancements pied by the State cannot apply in this case because, at the time 
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Mr. Beavers committed the offenses alleged in the Second Case, he had no prior drug 
convictions. 
B. Standard Or Review 
The question of whether a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction 
can be applied to a crime alleged to have been committed before the prior conviction 
came about requires interpretation of the statute authorizing the enhancement. And, 
since the interpretation of a statute raises a question of law, the district court's ruling in 
this case is subject to de nova review. Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. Kootenai 
County, 147 Idaho 173, 176, 208 P.3d 149, 152 (2009). 
C. Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Could Not Be Enhanced Based On 
His Prior Convictions In The First Case Because Those Prior Convictions Did Not 
Exist At The Time That He Allegedly Committed The Offenses At Issue In The 
Second Case 
Each of the three statutory enhancements at issue in this appeal is predicated 
upon the existence of a prior drug-related conviction. I.C. §§ 37-2739, -2739A, 
and -2732{B)(a)(7). Not one of these enhancements, however, is explicit as to what the 
prior conviction must be prior to. See I.C. §§ 37-2739, -2739A, and -2732(B)(a)(7). 
Must it prior to the commission of the subsequent offense? The filing of formal 
charges? The guilty plea or jury verdict? The sentencing hearing? Or formal entry of 
judgment? 
In this case, the district court seems to have assumed that the prior conviction 
need only have been prior to the sentencing hearing in the subsequent case. (See 
Tr. Vol. VI, p.1024, L.3- p.1025, L.10.) However, Mr. Beavers submits that the best 
reading of the enhancement statutes at issue in this appeal is that they require that 
37 
there have been one or more drug-related convictions prior to commission of the 
subsequent offense. Thus, Mr. Beavers contends that even if we are to assume that he 
was "convicted" of the offenses at issue in the First Case on June 19, 2008, the date the 
jury rendered its verdict in that case (R., pp.562), 15 those convictions cannot be used to 
enhance his sentences in the Second Case because those convictions did not exist on 
November 21, 2007, the date on which Mr. Beavers allegedly committed the offenses at 
issue in the Second Case. 
Mr. Beavers' interpretation of the enhancement statutes is based on the idea that 
all such enhancements are designed to punish recidivism; they are intended to impose 
a harsher punishment on the defendant who, after having been previously convicted 
(and typically punished) for his first drug crime and, thus, given a strong warning, failed 
to learn his lesson and reform his behavior, and subsequently committed another drug 
crime. This is certainly the purpose of Idaho's "persistent violator" enhancement statute 
(I.C. § 19-2514), see State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 565, 990 P.2d 144, 146 
(Ct. App. 1999); State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 339, 340, 971 P.2d 1161, 1163, 1164 
(Ct. App. 1998); State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 344, 715 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 
1986), and it would seem to be the purpose of the enhancements at issue in this 
appeal. 
Indeed, although it appears that the Idaho courts have not yet addressed the 
precise question involved in this case-whether a recidivism statute providing for 
15 Below, the State argued that under United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d 
1059 (2008), a guilty plea or a jury finding of guilt constitutes a "conviction," even if the 
defendant has not been sentenced and the district court has lodged no formal judgment 
of conviction. (R., p.665.) The district court agreed with the State on this point. (See 
Tr. Vol. VI, p.1024, Ls.3-18.) 
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enhanced penalties based on prior convictions applies to situations where the 
defendant was not actually convicted of the prior offense until after he committed the 
present offense-"[t]he rule in most jurisdictions with enhanced penalty statutes is that 
the prior conviction must precede the commission of the principal offense . . . ." 
Gargliano v. State, 639 A.2d 675, 683 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis in original}. See, 
e.g., State v. Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d 630, 641 (Ak. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that under 
Alaska's presumptive sentencing scheme, because the defendant committed three 
separate felonies before he was convicted of any of them, all three had to be treated as 
first convictions); State v. Ahakuelo, 683 P.2d 400, 403 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
that an enhancement for a prior DUI conviction did not apply where the defendant 
committed both DU ls before he was convicted of either); People v. Phillips, 502 N.E.2d 
80, 81-82 (111. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1986) (holding that an enhancement for a prior weapons 
conviction did not apply where the defendant committed both weapons offenses before 
he was convicted of either, and noting that "[a]n enhanced penalty should not be 
imposed until the offender has had the opportunity to reform after being punished for his 
first conviction"); State v. Osoba, 672 P.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (Kan. 1983) (holding that 
an enhancement for a prior DUI conviction did not apply where the defendant committed 
both DU ls before he was convicted of either); Bray v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 478, 
479-80 (Ky. 1985) (holding that a habitual offender enhancement did not apply where 
the defendant committed his third felony before he was convicted of his second felony, 
and noting that the philosophy behind Kentucky's habitual offender statute is that "a 
person who commits a felony after having been convicted of a felony has doubt cast on 
his ability to be rehabilitated and that a person who commits a felony after having been 
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convicted of a felony the second time may well be incorrigible and deserving of more 
extended incarceration"); State v. Nicholas, 491 So.2d 711, 715 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 
1986) (holding that a habitual offender enhancement had not been proven to be 
applicable because the government had failed to demonstrate the latest prior conviction 
had actually occurred prior to the defendant's commission of the present offense); 
Gargliano, 639 A.2d at 683 (holding that an enhancement for a prior drug convictions 
did not apply where the defendant committed the principal (third) drug offense before he 
was convicted of either of the previous two drug offenses); State v. Gehrke, 474 N.W.2d 
722, 726 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a habitual offender enhancement did not apply where 
the principal offense was committed while the defendant was out on bail awaiting trial 
for the prior offense because the defendant was not yet convicted for the prior offense); 
State v. Brezillac, 573 P.2d 1343, 1346 (1978) (holding that one cannot be deemed to 
be a habitual offender where the defendant was not convicted of the prior offense 
before he committed the principal offense, in part, because the purpose of the habitual 
offender enhancement is to punish those who have been granted a chance to reform 
but have failed to avail themselves of that opportunity). 
Mr. Beavers urges this Court to follow the majority rule and give the sentencing 
enhancements at issue in this case a faithful, logical interpretation. Assuming it does 
so, it should hold that the convictions in Mr. Beavers' First Case could not be used to 
enhance his sentences in the Second Case and, therefore, Mr. Beavers is entitled to a 
new sentencing hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Beavers respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his convictions and remand both of his cases for new trials, wherein he will be 
allowed to present his necessity defense and have the respective juries instructed on 
the affirmative defense of necessity. In the alternative, Mr. Beavers requests that his 
sentences be vacated and his cases remand for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2009. 
? 
~ ER/KR. LEHTJNEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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